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legislative right to changes in the legal character of estates and the
titles to property.
An estate is a man's interest in property. The legal character
of a man's interest in property is the nature, qualities or relations,
under the law, of that interest.
It may be viewed with respect to the property of other men, and
the remedies for securing its rights and redressing its wrongs, considered; or it may be viewed with respect to its own nature alone,
and its kinds, ownership, or title considered. The changes that may
be effected are as varied as the relations of property. Among them
may be enumerated the change in its character from converting real
into personal, or personal into real property. Again, real property
may be changed by changing the quantity of interest therein, whether
freehold or less than freehold, the time of its enjoyment, whether
in possession, remainder or reversion, or the number and connections of the tenants, whether in severalty or in common. Personal
property may be changed in its character as a chose in possession
or in action. Again, a very radical, indeed the most important
change that can take take place in the legal character of both real
and personal property, is effected by a change in its title, by a
transfer of its ownership from one individual to another individual,
The legal character of property is also
or set of individuals.
affected and indirectly changed by altering the remedies provided
W. W. B.
for enforcing its rights.1
Cambridge, Atass.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia Count1 .-- Lt
Equity.
3iITCHESON VS. HARLAN AND OTHERS.

1. The duty of the Governor in granting letters patent to a corporation under the
general railroad law of 1849, in Pennsylvania, upon the certificate of the commissioners named in the special act of incorporation that the provisions of the
general law have been complied with, is of a discretionary, and not of a ministerial
nature, and cannot, therefore, be interfered with by injunction or mandamus.
1 A second article has been prepared on this interesting branch of law, and will
appear in our next number.-Ed. Am. Law Reg.
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2. The commissioners named in a special act of incorporation under the general
railroad law having, as was alleged, acted, in taking the subscriptions to the
stock of the company, in a fraudulent and illegal manner, a bill was filed on
behalf of persons who had been thus prevented from subscribing, to restrain the
promoters of the company from applying for letters patent, and from proceeding to
organize the company by the election of officers and otherwise, and also to have
the former subscriptions declared void, and the commissioners directed to open a
new subscription, and for these purposes an injunction was appplied for. The
Governor in the meantime granted the letters patent, which fact was alleged in a
supplemental bill. The injunction was refused by the court, on the ground, that
it was too late to prevent the issuing of the letters, and that to prevent the further
organization of the company would amount to a forfeiture of the charter, which
could only be done at law by scirefaciasor quo warranto.
3. Where the original bill is for any reason fatally defective, it cannot be made the
basis of a supplemental bill.

This was an application for an injunction to restrain the defendants,
commissioners named in an act of Assembly incorporating the Philadelphia City Passenger Railroad Company, from making application
'to the Governor for letters patent, and from further proceeding with
'the organization of said company. The particulars set forth in the
bill filed, and the nature of the relief prayed for, will more fully
appear in the opinion of the court, which was delivered by
LUDLOW, J.-This bill is filed against the defendants, commissioners named in an act of Assembly entitled "An act to incorporate the Philadelphia City Passenger Railway Company." The bill
sets forth the fact that the commissioners proceeded to the discharge of their duties, according to the terms of the act of Assembly by virtue of which they assumed to act, and then charges that
the complainant Was pievented from subscribing to the stock of the
company by reason of the fraudulent acts of the commissioners, who
had conspired to defraud the complainant and the public, first, by
selecting an office for receiving the subscriptions located in an
unusual place, inaccessible and unsuited to the proper performance
of the duties of the commissioners; and secondly, by stationing upon
the stairway and entrances leading to the office an organized gang
of men, so as totally to preclude the access of the public to the
xoom until the whole of. the stock of the company had been sub-
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scribed for. The bill then prays the court to declare the subscriptions already made fraudulent and void, and to direct the commissioners to make and receive new subscriptions in such manner and
place as the court may direct.
The bill further prays for the interference of the court by injunction, and that the defendants may be restrained from making application to the Governor of the Commonwealth for letters patent, and
from holding an election for directors, or from further proceeding
-with the organization of the company, either as commissioners or
corporators, or as subscribers to or holders of the stock.
The very grave questions thus presented for our consideration
will require us to review the various acts of Assembly incorporating
the railway company, to investigate the merits of the case as disclosed upon the bill and affidavits presented upon the hearing of
this motion, and to examine the various questions of law involved
in the proper adjudication of the cause.
A review of the legislation which has brought this company into
existence will exhibit a history as interesting as it is extraordinary.
The original act of incorporation passed the Senate and House
of Representatives upon the same day, to wit: the 23d of March
last; tihe Governor disapproved of the act, and returned it to the
House in which it originated, with his objections.
Upon the 25th of March, notwithstanding the Executive disapproval, the bill passed the House of Representatives by the constitutional vote, and on the 26th of March, the bill having been sent
to the Senate, also passed that body by a similar vote, and thus
became a law of the State.
The act contains many sections not unlike those in other acts
incorporating railway companies, but it entirely omits an important
section, or clause of a section, which has been inserted in other acts,
and which provides, "That before the railway company shall commence to use the said streets, the consent of the 0ouncits of the city
of Philadelphiashall be first obtained."
Subsequently to the passage of what may be called the organic
law, a supplement was introduced materially affecting the provisions
of the original act, passed both branches of the legislature, and
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received the Executive approval on the 31st of March, 1859. This
supplement contains such remarkable departures from the provisions
of the general railroad law of 1849, and also from the provisions of
the act to which it is a supplement, as to call for a momefit's examination.
By its first section it repeals the provisions of the general railroad
law, requiring that twenty days notice shall be given by the commissioners therein named, of the time and place of opening books
and receiying subscriptions for stock; and declares that three days
or more, at the option of the commissioners, shall be the time
required.
It authorizes the commissioners to make as well as receive subscriptions for the stock.
By its second section it grants " the exclusive right to 'use and
occupyfor railroadpurposes" the streets, (Chestnut, Walnut, Front,

Twenty-second, and Sixty-fifth,) and directs that the road shall be
built with the form and "gauge, and in the manner and mode already
adopted by the Frankford and Southwark Passenger Railway Company, then places the construction of the road under the direction
of the Chief Engineer of the city, and concludes as follows: "And
so much of any law or ordinance as requires the proposed place,
courses, styles of rail, and manner of laying the same, to be approved
by the Board of Surveys and Regulations of said city, and all laws
conflicting or inconsistent with this supplement, be and are hereby
repealed ;" thus, among other things, repealing the 5th section of
the act to which this is a supplement, and which provides ".that the
said Councils (of this city) may, from time to time, by ordinance,
establish such regulations as may be required for the paving, repairing,
grading, culverting, and laying of gas and water pipes in and along
said streets and avenues, and to prevent obstructions therein."
We have thus briefly viewed the legislation by virtue of which a
company is to be created, because an intelligent comprehension of
the questions of law hereafter discussed renders it necessary for us
so to do.
If, however, upon the merits of this case, we have a serious doubt,
that doubt would be fatal to the present application, and we must,
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therefore, examine the facts as presented by the affidavits submitted.
The affidavits presented by the complainant establish the fact that
an organized gang of men took possession of the stairway leading to
the room occupied by the commissioners, that this gang had been
marshalled for the purpose long before daylight on the morning of the
8th of April; that it was impossible for the public to reach the rooms of
the commissioners until the whole of the stock had been taken; that
the leaders and members of this organized gang partook of refreshments in a room, which must have been under the immediate notice
of the commissioners, and free of charge, and that orders were communicated to this body of men from a room immediately adjoining
that in which the commissioners sat.
The facts thus sworn to by the complainants' witnesses are substantially uncontradicted by any evidence in the case.
The defendants and each of them deny any confederacy or agreement, either directly or indirectly, with any person or persons whatever to do, or cause to be done, any illegal act or thing; and further,
that the stock was not distributed by them in pursuance of any previous agreement or understanding, and yet they do not so contradict
certain material facts contained in the affidavits of complainant as
to bring us to the conclusion that the commissioners, or some one of
their number, had not a knowledge of or did not indirectly consent
to the transactions by which the public were excluded from the room
in which the commissioners sat.
The commissioners, except one of them, and six subscribers for
the stock of the company not commissioners, were together in the
room at a very early hour upon the morning in question. Now the
commissioners might have feared that unless they entered the office
at an early hour entrance might thereafter become almost impossible; but this by no means explains the presence of the six subscribers, who have submitted their affidavits, nor of the six
subscribers who have not submitted their affidavits, and who must
also have been in company with the commissioners. I say they
must have been with the commissioners, because, with the exception
of those who subscribed for this stock, no person reached the room
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,in which the book was open, until after all the stock was taken, and
the evidence is uncontradicted, that when the book was first opened
the gang had possession of the stairway. One of the commissioners,
-Mr. Grove, reached the house at a later hour than his co-commissioners, and the evidence is again uncontradicted, that he was at
once admitted to the room in the second story of the building, and
that the stairway was at that time in possession of the gang. True,
Mr. Grove says that his way was unobstructed, and that he did not
know the persons upon the stairway, but Kneass explains the whole
matter when he says that they, the gang, were directed, when Mr.
Grove appeared, to admit him at once and without obstruction.
When the commissioners organized, they requested all persons not
commissioners to leave the room, which they accordingly did, by
walking into an adjoining room; now at this time the gang had
possession of the stairway, and we cannot believe that this was not
the case, otherwise some person or persons, not subscribers, would
have been produced, who could have sworn to a state of facts which
would have rebutted the idea of an organized resistance to the admission of the public.
One of the commissioners swears that when the public had ceased
to take the stock the book was handed to the commissioners to enable
them to subscribe; the affidavits of several witnesses establish the
fact that a number of persons endeavored to reach the second story
of the building, but were prevented from so doing; now the public
could never have ceased making a demand for this stock while the
book was bpen, and before it was handed to the commissioners,
unless some obstruction prevented the accomplishment of that design;
and if the statement of the commissioners is true, the explanation is,
that the stairway being blockaded at the time the stock was being
subscribed for, the demand of the public ceased, and that, too, before
the whole of the stock was subscribed for. One of the subscribers
attributed his success to his superior powers of endurance, but the
evidence shows that his only competitors were the commissioners
and the other successful subscribers who were with him in the second
story room, at an early hour in the morning, before the gang took
possession of the stairway; and this conclusion is strengthened by
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the testimony of the commissioner just referred to, who says, the
public demand ceased-that is-in time to allow the commissioners
to subscribe to a large amount of the stock.
Having thus brought the commissioners and the successful subscribers together, and remembering that no person reached the
commissioners' room from a very early hour in the morning, except
Mr. Grove; (whose admission has been explained) we are not surprised to find that of the 10,000 shares of stock to be taken, 3,100
shares were subscribed for by the commissioners, 3,300 by the commissioners as attorneys for various persons, 700 shares by a son of
one of the commissioners, and the balance was divided among the
individuals who had, by an extraordinary coincidence, reached the
room at a very early hour in the morning, and at or about the time
the commissioners assembled, and before the gang took possession of
the stairway. Now, when it is remembered that the leaders of this gang
sat and drank at a table spread in the room adjoining that in which
the commissioners sat, and were passing and repassing in and out of
this room, how is it possible to believe that all of the commissioners
were ignorant of this state of things, and if not ignorant, they, or
some one or more of them countenanced and supported, and thereby
became parties to the acts of those upon the stairway, (even supposing no preconcerted arrangement existed) in such a way as to
require us to afford a remedy for the wrong committed, if we have
power so to do.
With this view of the facts of this case as presented by the affidavits, it becomes our duty to determine the rights of these commissioners, so far as their power to subscribe for the stock of the
company is concerned, for if, by the supplement to the original act
of Assembly, they have the legal right to absorb the whole stock,
then neither can the complainant nor the public object. We
therefore confine our attention exclusively to the supplementary
act, for it cannot be doubted that, by the terms of the original act,
the power now referred to does not exist. By the letter of this
supplement, the commissioners may "make and receive subscription," and in our interpretation of the act, we must be governed by
the general rules of law applicable to the construction of statutes,
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by the law as it stood prior to the passage of the supplement, and
by the language of the act itself. Everything which is within the
intent of the makers of the act, though it be not within the letter,
is as much within the act as if it was within the letter and intent
also. Walker vs. Deveraux, 4 Paige, Ch. 252; Stowell vs. Lord
Zowch, I Plow. 866; Dwairis on Stat., 691; and when the intention of the law is doubtful and not clear, the judges ought to interpret the law to be what is most consonant to equity and least
inconvenient. Xerlin's lessee vs. Bull, 1 Dal., 191.
And in the construction of a statute granting privileges to indi-viduals, when there is an ambiguity or inconsistency in the language of the grant, if one construction bears against the public
trade and public convenience and another abridges the grant, that
must be adopted which favors the public convenience and trade.
-Stormfeltzvs. The Manor Turnpike Company, 1 Harris, 560.
Keeping these principles in view, let us examine the law as it
stood prior to the passage of this supplement. Two of the judges
of the Supreme Court at Nisi Prius have already so clearly stated
the law, that it will be necessary simply to refer to their opinions
upon this point. Judge Woodward, in Martin Thomas vs. The
Citizens PassengerRailroad,says, "the commissioners acted under
the provisions of our general railroad law of 19th February, 1849.
The policy of that law is opposed to monopolies. It makes railroads incorporated under it public highways for purposes of transportation and travel, and it throws open the stock of new roads to
the public in the fullest and fairest manner."-MS. June 15th, 1858.
In Brower vs. The Passenger Railroad Company, Judge Strong
says: "I concur fully with what was stated by Mr. Justice Woodward in Thomas vs. The Citizens Passenger Railroad Company,
in regard to the policy of this enactment."
This, then, being the well settled interpretation of the statutes
relating to the subject under consideration, can the words of this
supplement alter the law? we think not, because the act simply
confirms a right which, under the old law, the commissioners pos,sessed, because at best there is an inconsistency in the terms of the
act which, under the construction contended for by the counsel for
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defendants, would enable them to exclude the public, and yet which
in plain language directs the commissioners to advertise and give at
least three days notice of the time for the opening of the books,
and for subscriptions to be made for the stock of the company.
The interpretation contended for by defendants would, in a case
of ambiguity and doubt, oblige the court to give a judicial sanction
to a most odious feature of a law which at best creates a dangerous
monopoly, and thus destroy the rights of the public and not maintain them, which we are bound, if possible, to do. 1 Harris, 560.
But the commissioners, if they enjoyed an exclusive privilege,
have waived it by assuming to discharge their duties as public
officers, and in a public manner, and by so doing, every principle
of right requires them to act in good faith to the public.
Having thus disposed of the rights of the commissioners, and
believing, as we do, that a wrong has been inflicted upon this complainant and the public, we are next to consider whether a remedy
exists, and if so, whether it is to be applied through the instrumentality of courts administering the common law, or whether a
Court of Chancery can, in the exercise of its well settled powers,
afford the desired relief.
There is an important fact developed by the testimony in this
cause, of which we must take judicial notice, to wit: the actual
existence of a corporation created by the letters patent issued by
the Governor of the State, in the name and by the authority of the
Commonwealth, and it matters not, in our view, whether these
letters patent were issued by the Executive before or after the bill
was filed in the case, for the bill, as filed, makes the commissioners
alone defendants, and, as the Governor has not been made a party
to this bill, (even if the legal right so to do existed) the process of
the court could not, in any contingency, prevent the issuing of the
letters patent.
A ,corporation, therefore, in fact exists, and unless we possess
the power to declare the act of the Governor null and void, and
thus destroy the corporation, we cannot grant the present motion.
What, then, was the nature and extent of the power delegated to
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ihe Governor under and by virtue of which the letters patent have
been issued ?
The act of 1849, known as the general railroad law, directs that
the Governor of the Commonwealth shall grant letters patent when
the commissioners certify that certain provisions of that law have
been complied with. This act is not unlike others devolving upon
the executive similar powers; as an illustration, we may refer to
the general banking law, which confers upon the Executive powers
precisely similar to those exercised in the present instance. Pardon Dig. 71, p. 11.
Can it be contended that when the legislative branch of the
government has devolved upon the executive of the State duties of
so responsible a nature, that that officer, representing, as he does,
an independent branch of the government, is to execute them simply
as a ministerial officer, and can exercise no discretion in the premises ? This principle can hardly be maintained, for be it observed,
the Governor of the Commonwealth is as much bound by his oath
of office, to execute the laws of the commonwealth with fidelity, as
any officer of either of the co-ordinate and also independent branches
of the government, and to deny to him the right to exercise a sound
discretion, is to make him the convenient instrument through and
by means of which the grossest frauds might with impunity be
perpetrated.
As an illustration of this principle, we will suppose that these
commissioners had received the subscriptions for the stock of this
company at the dead hour of the night, and ii open and notorious
violation of the organic law of their existence, can the proposition
be successfully maintained that the Governor of the Commonwealth,
as a ministerial officer, would be compelled to issue the letters patent,
and thus legalize a fraud.
Would the Supreme Court, even if they assumed the power to
grant a writ of mandamus, oblige the Governor, under such circumstances, to proceed to the execution of the letter of the law; if they
would not and could not do so, then the only alternative is to recognize
the existence of a discretionary power vested in the executive, and
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to be exercised according to the dictates of his own conscience and
judgment.
The Supreme Court- have in substance asserted a principle in
entire accordance with the views now suggested, in a reported case.
In Griffth vs. Cochran, 5 Binh. 87, an application was made to the
court for a mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Land Office
Oh. J. Tilghman, in his
to prepare and deliver land patents.
opinion delivered in that case, says: "The Secretary of the Land
Office may have reason to think that there has been .something
wrong in the conduct of the applicants for the land, or of the
Deputy Surveyor, or other officer; and in such a case, it would be
his duty to stop the calculations, until the matter is decided by the
(property) board. If the Secretary had refused to 'make any
calculations, or to take any step whereby the business of the
applicant might be despatched, it would certainly have been our
duty to compel him by mandamus," and it will be seen by a careful
examination of this case, that there is a well-defined distinction
recognized by the court between a mere ministerial act and a
ministerial act coupled with a duty, and which involves the exercise
of a discretionary power.
If, then, the Governor is vested with discretionary power, a great
public duty devolves upon him; and in the execution of this duty,
he may, if fraud exists, apply a most effective remedy, by arresting
the progress of the fraud, and by a refusal to issue the letters patent,
protect the rights of individuals and the public.
A proper respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government
will not allow us to presume that the Governor deliberately refused
to examine into the circumstances attending the discharge of the
duties by the commissioners, defendants in the bill; had he been
brought to the same conclusion upon facts presented, as we have
been obliged to arrive at, we doubt not that he would have refused
the letters patent; and even had he neglected so to do, we could
not for that reason grant the relief prayed for in this bill, unless
upon principles of equity of the most indisputable character, our
duty obliged us to interfere.
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The letters patent having been issued by the Governor, is there
no other remedy existing by which the Executive himself may
destroy the existence of this corporation, or attempt so to do, if it
shall appear that the letters patent have been unadvisedly granted?
Most undoubtedly, for the law provides the method, and the Executive may wield the power necessary to employ it. A corporation is
an artificial body, constituted of several members, united by its
franchises and liberties, which form its ligaments and essence.
Lilly's Pr. Reg. 459. The Legislature of Pennsylvania may
establish a corportion, that is, grant out a portion of the sovereign
power of the State, and the corporation exists by virtue of a constitutional exercise of sovereign power. .Murphy vs. Farmers' Bank
Schuylkill County, 8 Harris, 419. And the Governor of the Commonwealth may direct his Attorney-General to test the validity of
any letters patent, and submit to the proper judicial tribunals the
question of fraud for their determination. Murphy vs. Farmers'
Bank Schuylkill County, id. 419, if fraud exists, the fact is thus
judicially determined. The question is presented at the suggestion
of that branch of the government whose peculiar duty it is to see to
it, that the sovereign power of the people is not abused, and it is
determined by an appeal to another and entirely independent branch
of the government, the judicial, whose peculiar provision it is to
expound questions of law, and by its appropriate machinery resolve
questions of fact. Thus, by the harmonious action of the different
departments of the government, the interests of the people are
protected; while by a departure from these obvious rules, a collision
is produced, which must inevitably destroy the rights and sovereignty of the people, and eventually the government itself.
We can readily conceive of a question of fact being presented to
the consideration of the Governor, connected with the issuing of
letters patent, so embarrassed by conflicting testimony, as to render
the satisfactory solution of it a matter of very great doubt and
uncertainty. In such a case, for the executive to deny the letters
patent, would be' to assume a power which would destroy a right,
without the intervention of a court and trial by jury; whereas, we
have shown that the executive may grant the letters and eo instanti
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direct his attorney-general to test by the judicial proceedings
hereafter to be noticed, the question of fraud.
With the Governor of the commonwealth the responsibility rests,
unless a court of chancery can interfere in the summary manner
now invoked.
Has, then, a court of chancery the jurisdiction contended for ?
Let us examine this question.
It is an elementary doctrine, that courts of equity are governed
by as well defined principles as courts of common law jurisdiction;
they afford an effectual remedy, when the remedy at common law
is imperfect, but they do not, as has sometimes been erroneously
supposed, create a right which the common law denies; they give
effectual redress for the infringement of existing rights, when, by
reason of the special circumstances of the case, the redress at law
would be inadequate. Adams' Eq. 50-58.
To ascertain the jurisdiction of a court of equity, we must be
governed not only by general principles, but by established precedents both at law and in equity, for they contain the opinions of
experienced and learned jurists; and if, upon the one hand, we
discover a complete and adequate remedy at law, and upon the
other a total denial of jurisdiction in a given class of cases, it would
be an usurpation of power for us to seize a jurisdiction, in order to
reach a wrong perpetrated in a particular case.
Is there, then, in this instance a complete remedy at law, or a
remedy in its nature legal ?
In England, when the crown has unadvisedly granted letters
patent which ought not to have been granted, the remedy to repeal
the charter is by scire facias, 2 Black, 848 ; 3 id. 261, and authorities cited; and if the crown grants the same office by letters
patent dated on two consecutive days, the last are merely void, yet
the patentee of the first letters patent must bring sci. fa. in order
to avoid them by a judgment of the court. Grant on Corporations,
p. 40, and authorities cited. And the better opinion seems now to
be that the sci. fa. in this last case must issue upon the fiat of the
attorney-general; and although the writ of scire facias is the
proper remedy where there is an existing legal body capable of
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acting, but who have been guilty of an abuse of the power entrusted
to them, yet it cannot be doubted that an information in the nature
of a quo warranto will reach that corporation, which is a body corporate de facto, but which takes to itself to act as a body corporate,
but from some defect in its legal constitution cannot legally exercise the power affected to be used. Rez vs. Passmore, 3 T. R. 244,
245; Regents of University of .Maryland vs. Williams, 9 Gill &
Johns, 365; Attorney General vs. Utica Insurance Company,
2 Johns. Ch. 371; Slee vs. Bloom, 5 Johns. Oh. 880.
Nor can the existence of a corporation be attacked indirectly; if
its life -is to be taken, its vitality to be destroyed, it must be done
by proceedings instituted directly against the corporation.
So exceedingly careful has our oNun Supreme Court been upom
this point, that in Hibernia Turnpike Co. vs. Henderson, 8 S;,
& R., 223, although the court held that the commissioners could:
not dispense with the payment of a certain sum specified in the act
of incorporation, and that if they permitted a subscription to. be
made without such payment, the contract was void, and the company
could not recover the amount which ought to have been paid, the.
chief justice expressly avoided any insinuation against the validity
of the charter, and Judge Duncan, in .Kishacoquilas and CentreTurnpike Railroad Company vs. McConaby, 16 S. & R., 145,
comments upon the case last cited, and broadly affirms the general
doctrine to be, that a charter fraudulently obtained cannot be forfeited or repealed, except by scire facias or information, in the.
nature of a quo warranto.
These, then, being the remedies intended.to reach the class. of"
cases to which this belongs, it is not surprising that we havesearched in vain for a principle or precedent which would enable us.
to grant this motion, for while courts of chancery will hold corpora-.
tions accountable in a great variety of cases for breaches of trust,.
it cannot, either directly or indirectly, divest corporations of their- corporate character and existence.
Accordingly chancery never deals with the question of forfeiture.
Slee vs. Bloom, 5 Johns. Oh., 880 ; Attorney General vs. Earl of
Clarendon, 17 Yes. 491 ; King vs. W7itemarsh, 5 Term Rep., 85;
31
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Attorney General vs. Utica Insurance Company, 2 Johns. Ch.,
376; and in the State of New York, the late Chancellor Kent, who.
administered the duties of his high office with distinguished learning
and wisdom, and with an experience unsurpassed by that of any
other American equity lawyer or judge, never. exercised or attempted
to exercise such a jurisdiction, and it was at length conferred upon
courts of chancery by statute. N. Y. Rev. Stat. 581, 583.
If chancery never interferes in questions of forfeiture, shall it
go one step further, and assume to repeal an existing charter ?
Such a principle never has been asserted, nor can the most diligent
search discover such a precedent. The nearest approach to it may
be found in an expression of Chancellor Kent, in .Raigtvs. Day,
1 Johns. Ch., 18, when he expressed the opinion that commissioners
acting fraudulently in the apportionment of stock, may be controlled by judicial proceeding, but he abstains from any expression
of opinion upon the nature of the remedy to be applied. And
Chancellor Walworth, in Walker vs. Deveraux, 4 Paige Ch. 246,
points out a remedy, when he says, "if the apportionment of stock
was absolutely void, he (the complainant) has mistaken his remedy,
he should in that case have applied to the Supreme Court for a
mandamus." That is, the complainant cannot ask for the interference of a court of equity, he must go to a court of law; for any
jurisdictionpossessed by chancerycan only be in aid of or ancillary
to a remedy at law.
Nor can the supplemental bill filed in this case extend our jurisdiction ; for apart from the fact that it is filed against the corporators, and not the commissioners, if the original bill is fatally defective, and we could not make a valid decree upon it, it cannot be made
the basis of a supplemental bill. Chandler vs. Petit, 1 Paige, 168;
Bank of Kentuccy vs. Schuylkill Bank, 1 Pars. Sel. Eq. Ch. 214.
The letters patent having been issued by the governor, we will
not, under the prayer of this bill, now interfere with the corporation,
and although the defendants may, if the circumstances of the case
warranted it, be punished for a contempt for having applied to the
Governor of the State for letters patent after bill filed and cautionary order, that punishment could not afford the relief which the

RICHARDS' ADMINISTRATOR vs. DAVIS.

483

complainant seeks, and to grant the last prayer of the bill, and
thereby restrain the defendants from organizing the company, would
be to destroy the corporation itself, which in this proceeding we
have no powver to do; 'should we assume the power, we have already
shown that ive-would prevent, by the order of a court of chancery,
the defendants from the performance of a duty, which upon the
common law side of our own court we would by mandamus compel
them to perform.
The further consideration of the other points presented on the
argument of the cause becomes now unnecessary, and, in conclusion,
we can only say that, while, with our view of the facts of this case,
we would consider ourselves obliged to afford relief, our view of the
law, as administered in courts of equity, obliges us to deny the
motion; to grant it would be to usurp a jurisdiction which we do
not possess. There is, however, a satisfaction in knowing that the
letters patent can be repealed, and the corporation destroyed, by a
proceeding at law, to be instituted by the attorney general of the
commonwealth.
The motion for a special injunction is refused.

In the District Court for the City and County of Philadelphia.
RICHARDS' ADMINISTRATOR VS. DAVIS.
1. A pledge for a loan of money to be repaid at a'fixed time, may be s6ld by the
pledgee, after the time for redemption has gone by, and a demand for repayment
duly made, provided reasonable notice be also given to the pledger, of the time
and place of the intended sale.
2. The law is the same where the pledge is a promissory noto of a third person,
when the note will not mature until long after the time fixed for repayment of
the loan.
STROUD, J.-The matter in dispute in this case was referred, by
agreement of the parties, to a referee, under the sixth section of the
Act of Assembly relating to reference and arbitration, passed the
16th -day: of June, 1836.

RICHARDS' ADMINISTRATOR vs. DAVIS.

On the hearing of the parties, the referee made an award, that
there was due from the defendant to the plaintiff the sum of $331
and costs of- suit.
By a statement, in writing, of the referee, it appears that, in the
month of April, 1857, William H. Richards, Jr., the intestate of
the plaintiff, being the owner of a promissory note for 81,100, dated
April 4th, 1857, made by Ml. . J. 0. Crees, payable after four
months to the order of Morgan H. Jones, and by him endorsed, and
also endorsed by Howard Tilden, was desirous of selling, and for this
purpose entrusted it to a friend, who employed Edward S. Jones
as a note broker. Jones made an effort to sell the note, but met
with no success. On the 22d of April, 1857, he pledged the note
to the defendant for a loan of $490, to be repaid on the 2d of May,
1857.
The money so obtained was not repaid at the time stipulated,
and on or about the 10th of May, 1857, Davis told Jones that he
must come and pay the loan, or he would be obliged to sell the
note. Jones begged for a few days' delay, but made no objection
otherwise to the defendant's communication.
Subsequently, the defendant placed the note in the hands of a
broker for sale, who, after the 20th of May, 1857, sold it for $800.
After deducting a commission of $10, the broker handed the
balance, $790, to the defendant. The purchaser of the note was
Tilden, the endorsee. The referee finds that the sum for which
the note was sold was the highest price that it would bring.
In June, 1857, a tender was made to the defendant, in behalf of
the plaintiff's intestate, of all the money then due on the loan, and
a simultaneous demand was made on the defendant to return the
note. This request not having been complied with, the present
suit was instituted to recover the value of the note.
The award of the referee was for the difference, with interest,
between the $490 loaned to the plaintiff's intestate by the
defendant, and the $790, the net proceeds of the note sold by order
of the defendant.
The important facts thus presented are, that the pledge was a
negotiable promissory note, endorsed by the payee, and afterwards
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by a third person-the time for its redemption fixed, and this time
would happen long before the maturity of the note. A demand for
redemption was duly made by the pledgee-and a reasonable time
after the demand for redemption having passed, without payment
of the money loaned, the pledgee, through the agency of a note
.broker, sold the note for the best price which could thus be obtained
for it. No notice of any kind was given to the pledger subsequent
to the demand for redemption of the note..
The exceptions to the award of the referee require a consideration
of the following propositions: 1. Whether, when the pledge is a
negotiable promissory note, and actually negotiated, the pledgee is
restricted, in the use of means to reimburse himself, to an action at
law upon the promissory note-or whether a pledge of this description is subject to the same rules of law which apply to pledges of
movable goods, stocks, and other securities not strictly negotiable.
2. Whether, where no special contract has been made between
the parties, and the pledge being a promissory note, has not been
redeemed within the appointed time and after notice to redeem has
been given, the pledgee may sell the note, through the agency of a
note broker, without giving notice to the pledger of the time and
place of the intended sale, or of the name and place of business of
the broker, and such other particulars as may be appropriate to the
nature of the pledge.
The first proposition has been suggested by the 321st section of
Story on Bailments. It is there said, "Where the pledge is a
negotiable security (such as a negotiable note), the pledgee has a
right to recover and receive the money due thereon, and to sue for
it in his own name. But he has no right (unless, perhaps, in a very
extreme case) to compromise with the parties to the security for a
less sum than the sum due on this security; and if he does, he will
be compelled to account to the pledger for the full value."
No other writer on this subject, it is believed, has made a similar
statement. Judge Story refers to none. He relies entirely upon
two reported decisions-one, Bowman vs. Wood, 15 Mass. R. 534;
the other, Garlicek vs. James, 12 Johns. R. 146.
Bowman vs. Wood was assumpsit by the endorsee against the

RICHARDS' ADMINTISTRATOR vs. DAVIS.

maker of a negotiable promissory note. The plaintiff, a deputy
sheriff, having an execution against one iHodge, received from him
the note in question as a pledge or collateral security for the
discharge of the execution; the note being signed by the defendant,
and endorsed in blank by Hodge. The plaintiff (the pledgee) kept
it for two months, and then advertised it, as the property of Hodge,
and sold it at auction to himself, as the highest bidder, of -which he
made return on the execution. The note was due when it was
endorsed by Hodge, and transferred to the plaintiff as a pledge.
Here the action was not between the pledger and pledgee. The
pledger was the payee and endorser of the note, and the action was
upon the note, against the maker. There seems not to have been
any dispute as to the genuineness of the note, nor was there any
lapse of time which could avail the defendant as a bar, nor any
allegation of mala fides, in any respect, as to the conduct of the
plaintiff to the defendant. The only defence which was open to the
defendant, was payment. This was the view of the Court. "The
note," it was said, "being negotiable, having been endorsed for a
valuable consideration, and there being no proof that it has been
paid, the plaintiff is, of course, entitled to recover."
This was the only point decided by the court. As the holder of
a promissory note, given for value and endorsed and delivered for
value, the plaintiff had, primafacie, a good cause of action, which
nothing offered by the defendant conduced at all to overcome.
The plaintiff had given evidence, it would seem, of the facts, that
he had obtained the note of the endorser as a pledge, and had after-wards advertised and sold it as the property of the endorser, under
the execution which had been put in his hands against him, and
that he had become, as he supposed, the purchaser of the note in
that way. But the court declared this procedure had conferred no
title to the note.
In reference to the transfer of the note by the endorser to the
plaintiff, as a pledge, the court used the language, "having received
it as a pledge for the payment of the execution, he must account to
the endorser for the proceeds."
This remark is the only ground which this decision affords for
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*the broad principle of the text in the law of bailments. And this
remark, though true, was manifestly extra-judicial, and, consequently, possessed no binding force, even on the court that made it.
it is plain thiat, whether the plaintiff's title to the note was derived from the endorsement and delivery by Hfodge, or from the
pretended sale on the execution, it was of no importance as a
,defence to the maker. The case therefore determines nothing, nor
,does the opinion even extra-judicially express anything which substantiates the main principle of the text.
aarlick vs. James, undoubtedly involved the consideration of
the law relative to the power of a pledgee and the mode of proceedings to enforce payment of money for which the pledge was given.
The action was brought by the pledger against 'the pledgee. The
declaration is a special one, claiming damages for the abuse by the
pledgee of his power over the pledge, and the pledge was a negotiable promissory note which had several years to run before
maturity.
The note bore date November 1, 1802, was for $600, payable on
November 1, 1807. The maker was Seth Garlick, and the payee
Samuel Garlick, the plaintiff. On the 29th of January, 1803, the
plaintiff being indebted to the defendant James, in the sum of 300
dollars, the plaintiff pledged this note to the defendant, to secure
the debt due by him and a co-debtor. No time iwas FIXED for the
redemption of the pledge.
The defendant retained the note until some time in 1810, when
he gave it up to the maker, receiving in exchange a note for $300
*of a third person. This latter note was subsequently paid to the
defendant; - It was testified by Seth Garlick, the maker of the note
pledged and afterwards surrendered, that he was at the time and
continued to be abundantly able to pay the whole amount (%600)
'of the pledged note.
It is stated in the opinion of the court, not only that the pledge
'was for an indefinite time, but that the pledger was never called
upon to redeem.
The pledge, consequently, had never been forfeited, and it had
been given up to the maker, abundantly able to pay the whole
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amount on its face, in exchange for a note for one-half of its value.
The point for which the decision of the court is referred to by
Judge Story, did not arise in the case.
It would involve no inconsistency to acquiesce in the principles
and in the very points of both these decisions, and at the same time
withhold assent to the proposition in the law of bailments.
Where, as in Bowman vs. Wood, the promissory note was due
when it was pledged, and could therefore be sued upon immediately,
there might, perhaps, be some reason to infer, in the absence of
any agreement to the contrary, that the purpose of the parties was
to restrain the pledgee to an action upon the note. For this course
would be open to him although the time of redemption had not yet
arrived, and even might be quite distant. But that a pledge of
this kind is subject to the same law, where the time for redemption
is fixed, and must happen long before the maturity of the note, and
consequently long before a suit can be brought upon it, has neither
reason nor convenience to recommend it. Practically such a law
would render the obtaining of a loan on such a pledge, impossible.
We find, therefore, no ground of exception to the award on this
score.
But the opinion of the referee went beyond this question, and
decided that it was not a part of the law of pledge, that notice
should be given to the pledger, of the time and place, -when and
where, after the period for redemption of the pledge had passed,
the pledgee intended to sell or otherwise dispose of the pledge in
order to reimburse himself.
The chief ground of this opinion seems to have been the instructions to the jury in De Lisle vs. Priestman, 1 P. A. Browne's
Rep. 176.
It is not necessary to narrate particularly the facts of that case.
It is enough to say, that the action was brought by the pledger of
a large number of shares of stock in an Insurance Company, to
recover damages of the pledgee for a refusal to re-transfer such.
stock which had been assigned to him at the giving of the pledge.
The concluding part of the charge of the judge who presided on
the trial was, "if you think, upon a view of the whole evidence, the
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-stock was pledged for an indefinite period of time, and sold without
notice to the plaintiff, your verdict should be in his favor, for such
damages as in your judgment he ought to recover. But if you
think the stock was pledyed for a FIXED period of time, your verdict should be for the defendant.
Upon the first branch of these instructions there is a general
agreement, in the authorities, with the ruling of the court, and as
the jury found that the pledge had been made without an agreement
fixing the time for the repayment of the loan, the directions upon
the second branch become of no importance to any one concerned
in the cause.
It is quite clear, we think, that the court fell into a mistake on
the second branch of the charge, which related to a pledge made on
a loan to be repaid at afixed time.
As early as 1714, a decision was made by the House of lords,
on a state of facts which presented this very point.
There are two reports of this decision: one in 1 Peere Williams,
261, entitled Tucker vs. Wilson; the other in 1 Brown P. 0. 494,
where the names are Wilson vs. Tooker, adm'r of Thynne. The
names ought to be given as Brown has given them. His report is
more precise and full in the statement of the case, and the argument of counsel is at greater length, and goes more into details in
reference to the facts. Wilson lent to Thynne a large sum of
noney, for which Thynne assigned to him certain exchequer annuities, and at the same time Wilson gave a defeasance, covenanting,
on repayment of the money lent and interest on a named day, he
would re-assign the annuities to Thynne, &c. The time fixed for
the re-payment of the loan was January 8th, 1709. In April,
1710, Thynne died without having paid any part of the money
which he had borrowed, and Tooker received letters of administration with the will annexed, &c. Wilson repeatedly requested the
re-payment of the loan, but without success, when, according to
Brown, "by a letter dated the 24th of March, 1711, he gaw
notice to Tooker, administrator of Thynne, that lie would proceed
to sell the annuities, at the -Exchange,on Wednesday, the 2d of
April then next, and desired him to attend at that time, to see that

. RICHARDS' ADMINISTRATOR vs. DAVIS.

they sold for the highest price the market would then yield. But
when the day came, Tooker desired a postponement of the sale to
the londay following, and underneath an attested copy of Wilson's
letter of notice, wrote the following words: "M1r. Wilson, I desire
you would suspend the sale of the annuities till Monday next, and
you will very much oblige your very humble servant,
JAmES TOOKER."

"The money not being paid, nor any further delay requested, the
annuities were, on the 7th of April, 1712, sold by an eminent brobroker on the -Exchange, for the highest price which they were
then worth."
This narrative is taken almost verbatim from Brown's report.
In his preface, he takes credit to himself for "a particularattention to dates," and this report certainly affords a good illustration
of his precision in this respect.
On afirstperusal of Brown's report, giving him credit for accuracy
as well as precision, in his dates, the proper conclusion seemed to be
that at least a year had intervened between the time fixed by the notice of the lender to the administrator of the borrower,for selling the
annuities and the actual time of the sale. On close examination,
however, of other parts of his statement, and especially of facts
contained in the argument of counsel, it seemed clear that this
could not have been so-that the sale must have taken place at or
about the time, whatever that was, to which it had been postponed
at the solicitation of Thynne's administrator.
The Almanacs of 1712 showed that April 2d of that year fell on
Wednesday, which was named in the letter of ivarch 24, 1711, as
the time of the intended sale; the next M1onday, to which Tooker
had requested a postponement, would be April 7, 1712,-the very
day on which Brown states that the sale took place.
The apparentdiscrepancy in the dates is entirely removed by the
fact, (which one living at the present day may be excused for not
reverting to at once,) that at the period of these transactions the
legal year began on March 25, and consequently that Milarch 24,
1711, (the date of the original notice by the lender,) was the last
day of that year ; and of course April 2, "then next," as the notice
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.said, was April 2, 1712,-andfive days future, would be Monday,
*April 7, 1712-THE ACTUAL DAY OF THE SALE.
The case, therefore, as reported by Brown, in so far as the facts
are important, furnishes clear evidence that not only was there a
demand for re-payment of the loan, after the time fixed for that
purpose had gone by, but an exact notice of the time and place of
the intended sale was given by the jlender to the borrower, and that
this notice was strictly complied with in the actual sale.
It was determined by the Rouse of Lords, that the course pursued
by the pledgee was a proper one, and the sale valid.
On the trial of De Lisle vs. Priestman, this decision of the
House.of Lords appears to have been cited by the counsel of the
defendant. It is manifest, therefore, that the decision was not
rightly apprehended, for there was no pretence that the defendant
had given notice to the plaintiff of his intention to sell the stock at
a particular time and place, and consequently, instead of aiding the
defence, its plain effect was directly the other way.
Peere Williams' report was that cited in De Lisle vs. Priestman. In general, he is to be regarded as an accurate reporter.
But in the case in the House of Lords-Tucker vs. Wilson, as he
has it-his statement, on the important point whether the sale of
the pledge took place on the day appointed for the purpose, is calculated to induce the belief that there was no such correspondence.
For having mentioned that there was a fixed time for the repayment of the loan, that it was not then repaid, he proceeds to say,
cupon which the lender frequently desired the money, and gave
notice that he would sell, and appointing a time for that purpose,
desired the borrower to be present to see that the annuity was sold
at the full value. The borrower, by letter, desired that the lender
would stay a week longer before he sold, which was also complied
.with."
Thus far the statement is neatly and clearly given. But immediately following is this language: "And then the lender, dying
suddenly, the defendant, his administrator, sold the annuity at
the Exchange, by a sworn broker, for the full value that those
annuities then sold for."
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Here, by the interpolation of the words, "and then the lender,
dying suddenly, the defendant, his administrator,sold the annuity," &c., the necessary inference is that the time to which the sale
had been postponed, elapsed in the life time of the lender; that some
time was taken up in procuring letters of administration, that the
administrator then entered upon his duties, and without any fresh
notice the annuities were sold by him.
We thus get from the whole statement the impression that the
borrower, finding himself unable to repay the loan within the time
for which he had solicited and obtained a postponement of the sale,
abandoned the pledge, and afterwards the administrator of the lender
sold it at his own convenience. If this were so, the facts would
not warrant the opinion that a sale, to be valid, should be preceded
by a notice to the pledger of the time and place when and where the
pledge was intended to be sold.
From the way in which the case stood in the House of Lords, it
is not, perhaps, a necessary conclusion, that the judgment of that
tribunal depended upon the notice of sale given by the pledgee to
the pledger.
The case was brought into the House of Lords on an appeal from
the decree of Lord Chancellor Harcourt. Lord Harcourt decided
that a pledge could not be sold by the pledgee, without a foreclosure
of the right of redemption in chancery. The House ofLords reversed
this decree. But it is to be borne in mind that on appeals the cause
is regarded, essentially, as a proceeding de novo. Not only is a
wrong judgment to be reversed, but a right one is to be entered. It
was so in that case. The judgment of the House of Lords is set forth
at length in Brown.
Chancellor Kent, both in Hart vs. Ten .Eyck, 2 Johns. C. Reports, 100, and in his Commentaries, vol. 2, p. 582, speaks of "a
reasonable previous notice to redeem," as a prerequisite to the sale.
"This," he adds, "was settled in the case of Tucker vs. Wilson,
and Lockwood vs. -Ewer." And so the Supreme Court of Massachusetts states the law to be, citing the same cases which are referred
to by Chancellor Kent, superadding the authority of his decision
in Hart vs. Ten Eyck, and in the Commentaries. Parker vs.
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Branker, 22 Pick., 46. Notice of the time and place of the intended
sale of the pledge, is not mentioned as requisite by either of these
eminent authorities, whilst both insist upon "a previous notice to
the debtor to redeem" as indispensable, and a reference is made in
both, to Tucker vs. Wilson, as the precedent for this opinion.
Why both these authorities should infer, from Tucker vs. Wilson,
that it was indispensable on the part of the pledgee to give special
notice to the pledger to redeem, and pass over, as if unimportant,
the notice of the time andplace of sale, can hardly be accounted
for on any other supposition than that the latter subject was
obscured by Pdere Williams, and the dates of Brown, owing to the
change in the calendar in 1752, not apprehended.
Each kind of notice is mentioned in the reports, and in the
argument of counsel, contained in Brown, notice of the time and
place of sale is distinctly mentioned as part of "the known and
constant practice, in the case of mortgages of such securities, where
the money has been neglected to be paid at the time stipulated, TO
PROCEED TO A SALE ON GIVING EIGHT OR TEN DAYS' NOTICE."

And inasmuch as when a time for redemption is fixed, the bor.
rower might well be considered as needing no further notice on that
head, it would seem much more reasonable to dispense with this
than to permit a sale of the pledge to be made without distinct
warning to the pledger.
Judge Story is quite explicit and positive in requiring notice of
the sale to be given. "lHe (the pledgee) may proceed to sell ex
mero motu, upon giving due notice of his intention to the pledger."
Law of Bailments, § 310. He does not, it is true, cite Tuker vs.
Wilson for this, and the authorities which he does cite can hardly
be said to bear him out. But he lays down the necessity of notice
of the sale without any qualification, and the Supreme Court of
New York, in Stearns vs. Marsh, 4 Denio, 227, covers the whole
ground of notices, as well in respect to redemption as to the time
and place of the intended sale. Both are held to be indispensable.
It may, perhaps, be asked, of what practical value can it be to
the pledger of a promissory note; to be informed by the pledgee
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that he has placed the note in the hands of a broker, to be disposed of by him in the usual manner of such securities.
When the pledge consists of movable goods, they are generally
sold at public auction, after proper advertisement in the newspapers. And it is obvious enough that notice of the time .and
place of sale may be advantageous to the pledger.
Stocks, and similar securities, are sold at the brokers' board.Notice of the time and place may, unquestionably, be rendered serviceable to the pledger, who may influence his friends and others to
give orders to purchase, which may insure the full market value.
The mode of selling promissory notes through the agency of a
note broker, cannot, perhaps, be quite so readily turned to account
by the pledger. Yet, as the name. and place of business of the
broker must be furnished to the pledger a reasonable time before
the actual sale should be made, we are assured, by very competent
authority, that the pledger may frequently advance his interest, by
procuring friendly purchasers to apply to the broker, or by substituting other pledges better suited to the existing demands of the
market, or by recourse to other legitimate expedients, which a shrewd
and well informed broker with whom, by the notice, he may be put
into communication, may suggest.
And whether or not such notice be likely, in general, to result
beneficially to the pledger, the chance, whatever may be its. worth,
is his right, and a proper administration of the law demands its
protection.
The first and second exceptions taken by the plaintiff are sustained, and the award set aside.
Award set aside.

In the Circuit Court of the United States.
PAUL T.JONES VS. THE FLOATING ZEPHYR. L. G. MYTINGER&C. VS. THE SAME.
Where a ship is detained in port by ice, and her cargo is damaged before the season
allows her to proceed, though she subsequently delivers it to the consignees, a
shipper cannot, without rescinding the contract, sustain a libel in rem for a breach

of the bill of lading, until the term for the performance of the contract has
expired.
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. These cases came into the Circuit Court on appeal from a decree
in the admiralty in favor of the respondent. Both appeals involved
the same questions, and were argued and-decided together.
I The libel, in the first case, was presented on February 28th, 1856;
that in the second case was presented March 10th, 1856.
The libellants, respectively, alleged that in the month of December, 1855, they shipped on board the ship The Floating Zephyr, a
foreign vessel, belonging to the port of Boston, but then lying in
the port of Philadelphia and bound for Liverpool, a certain number
of barrels of flour, to be carried to Liverpool and to be delivered
there in good order and condition, to the order of the shipper, or to
assigns (in the first case,) and (in the second case,) to Richardson,
Spence & Co., or their assigns. Bills of lading, in the usual form,
were signed by Shepherd Blanchard, the master of the ship, and
part owner thereof. That the officers of the ship, in disregard of
their duty, and contrary to the usage of merchants and of this port,
received on board a large quantity of Indian corn, a portion of which
was unsound, and all of which was improperly and defectively
stowed, being placed in the hold, in layers under and over the barrels of flour. That the ship, by unreasonable delay in her sailing,
became frozen up in her berth, and did not begin the voyage for
a period of five weeks and upwards, during which time the corn
gradually deteriorated by and under the influence of the heat of the
,ship. That the damaged corn was not discharged from the ship as
it should have been, but was allowed to injure and destroy the flour.
That on or about the 20th of February, 1856, the corn and flour
were removed-spoiled and offensive-from the ship, by the order of
the master; the flour being stored on shore, and so damaged by the
heat as to be unfit for reshipment. That the performance of the
contracts, in the bills of lading, was thus rendered impossible by
the negligence of the officers of the ship. That the damage to the
*libellants arose from the unreasonable delay in sailing, the unfit
condition of part of the cargo, and the defective stowage of the
whole of it.
The answer of Shepherd Blanchard denied that the cargo was
improperly stowed, or that the Indian corn was in an unsound con-
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dition when received. The respondent alleged that the cargo was
stowed in a customary and proper manner. That the ship was
detained entirely by the ice; and that, while frozen in, precautionary measures were taken to prevent injury to the cargo. That on
the 15th of February a survey was had. That on the 18th of
February the respondent apprised the shippers by letters, of the condition of the cargo, but that they refused to co-operate with him in
any measures for its safety. That the cargo was discharged in
compliance with the recommendations of the surveyors. That on
the 23d of February, at the instance of the consignees, a second
survey was made. That in accordance with the opinion of the surveyors, the damaged flour was reshipped for transportation. That
the voyage to Liverpool was not broken up, and the performance of
the contract had not been rendered impossible by the negligence of
the owners of the ship.
The Floating Zephyr sailed for Liverpool subsequently to the
filing of the libels, and delivered her cargo to its consignees.
The District Court, after argument dismissed the libels.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
KA-E, J.-It is unnecessary to decide most of the questions that
were argued so fully by the counsel in these cases. There is a
difficulty in the way of the libellants' recovery, which is at the
threshold, and is, as it seems to me, insuperable.
They were shippers on board the Zephyr. She was arrested at the
wharf, after lading, by the ice of winter; and the libellants' goods
were damaged before the season allowed her to proceed. She
sailed, however, at the earliest practicable time, and delivered her
cargo at its place of destination to the several consignees. These
suits were instituted by the shippers on their bills of lading, while
the vessel was still at her port of departure. It is obvious that
they were instituted too soon. The ship is liable integrally for the
damage sustained by the cargo during the voyage by reason of
causes not excepted against in the contract of affreightment. But
she cannot be libelled nor her owners sued de die in diem., as the
voyage advances, and one item or circumstance of default and
damage follows another. The contract is an entire one, and unless
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it be rescinded, the recourse for a breach of it must be sought when
the term for its performance has expired. The liabilities under it
cannot be split up; Valin L. 3, T. 3 art. 9; 2 Boulay Paty, 390.
To meet this objection, the libellants allege in argument that the
voyage was broken up by the-detention of the vessel, and the contract for carriage abandoned; and they liken the case of detention
by ice, to that of detention by blockade, which according to the
adjudication in 3 S. & R. 559, (Stoughton vs. -?appaM) is said to
justify a rescission of the contract by the shippers. But without
entering upon the question, whether the declaration of a blockade
has this effect, which has been decided by many jurists, (see the
opinion of Chancellor Kent in Palmervs. Lorillard,16 Johns, 348,
and Falin's Commentary on the 8th article of title 1, book 3 of the
Ordonnance,) it is enough to observe:First.-That the ground on which a blockade is supposed to have
this effect, is simply the uncertainty of its duration, it resting in
the discretion of an enemy, while the period of a detention by ice
is ascertainable within reasonable limits, which must be understood
to have been in the view of the parties a detention "par force
majeure a cause d'un obstacle passages." Val.
Second.-The case referred to was a case of replevin; and it
decides, not that even a blockade rescinds the contract of affreightment, but that it justifies a party in rescinding it. Now, in the
cases before me, the parties have not claimed to rescind the contract; but on the contrary, they establish it by claiming damages for
a breach of the bill of lading, which defines its terms; as their consignees also have done, by accepting the goods when they arrived
out.
The libels must, therefore, be dismissed. I do not pass upoi the
question, whether there was defective stowage of the libellants'
goods; nor upon the question of law which was pressed in the
argument, whether the libellants could rightfully have reclaimed
them, or can now claim damages for the injury they may have
sustained, without exhibiting as evidences of their title all the
parts of the bill of lading. The references to Abbott, 596; Valin
L. 3. T. 3, art. 17, Emerigon Ass. ch. 11, sect. 3. §7; and Boulay
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Paty, 2 Do. Com. Mar. T. 7, § 1, would, however, suggest to this
last question, a negative answer."
.Mr. Paul and Mr. Geo. H. Wharton for the appellants (the
libellants below,) made the following points:
I. The voyage was broken up, because,
1. The character of the article was changed by the fault of the
carrier, before the departure of the vessel. It was no longer flour,
but something else.
2. Of the lapse of time-a period of two months, and moreafter the shipment of the cargo.
8. Of the entire discharge of the cargo.
4. Of the new voyage having been undertaken, merely by (greement, between the captain and certain shippers. The libellants
refused to consent to the arrangements of those parties, with regard
to the disposition of the cargo.
II. It was within the power of the libellants to consider the
voyage as at an end.
,Stoughton vs. Bappal,, 3 S. & R., 559; Valin Coni. on art. 9.
Pothier, Traite de la Charte Partie, part 1, sec. 4, Nos. 97. 98,
102; The Isabella, 4 Rob. 77; 2 Boulay Paty, 385, 6, Title 8,
see. 6.
II. Duty of the captain in regard to stowage; and the specific liability of the ship for the negligence or bad stowage of the
master.
Flanders on Shipping, p. 214, § 200, etc., and cases cited;
Abbott, 425; Curtis on Merchant Seamen, 218-14; Clark vs.
Barnwell, 12 How., 278; Bich vs. Lambert, Ib.847.
Flanders, 217, § 202. Schooner Freeman vs. Buckingham,
18 How., 183.
Brassvs. Maitland, 88 Eng. Com. Law, 470 ; Ibid, p. 476, note.
IV. The real owner must sue in the admiralty. The bare legal
title will be disregarded as in equity.
V. Consignor must sue when he is the real owner of the goods.
Flanders, pp. 461-4, and cases therein cited; Ludlow vs. Bowne,
1 John, 1; Freeman vs. Birch, 1 Nev. & Mfar., 420; Davis vs.
James, 5 Burr., 2680; Grove vs. Brien, 8 How., 439; Lawrence
vs. Minturn, 17 How., 100.
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Mr. Kane and Mr. 6reo. W. .Biddle for the appellee, (the
respondent below,) contended:
L That the action was one purely in rem, and as such, was
dependent upon the General Maritime Law. The Rebecca, Ware's
Rep. 190, 191, 192; The Yankee Blade, 19 How., 89, 90.
IL That the contract in each case, in the bills of lading, was
an indivisible one. It was still in force when the suits were instituted. The recourse for the breach of a contract must be sought
when the term for its performance has expired. The vessel subsequently sailed; her cargo was delivered to the consignees. The
suits were premature ; 2 Boulay Paty, 390. Logan vs. Caffrey,
6 Casey, 196.
The parties here did not claim to have rescinded the contract.
They treated it as still subsisting. They therefore cannot recover.
Goodman vs. Pocock, 69 Eng. Com. Law, 576.
II. That these contracts are terrean rather than maritime in
their character, and are therefore not within the jurisdiction of the
admiralty.
IV. That the libellants were bound to exhibit, as evidence of
their title, all parts of the bills of lading. Even if the voyage had
been broken up, the title to sue, in respect to Mytinger & Co.'s
shipment, was in the endorsees of their bill of lading.
As to the right of the endorsee or consignee to bring his action,
they cited 6 S. & R., 429; Lord Raymond, 271; "12 Mod., 146;
8 Howard, 438 ; 17 How., 107.
V. That there was no evidence, in the cases, of bad stowage,
or of negligence in the conduct of the master.
This point, however, was not much discussed by the counsel for
the respondent, who relied mainly upon the questions of law comprehended in the four preceding points.
After the aigument upon both sides had been concluded, GRimi, J.
affirmed the decree of the District Court, dismissing the libels.'

I It may be proper to remark,

that the decree of the Circuit Court must, for the

present, be regarded as a contingent decision of these cases.

The learned Judge

will write an opinion only in case the libellants determine not to appeal to the

-Supreme Court of the United States. Should they conclude, by next October, not
to briug the cases before that tribunal, Judge Grier will formally decide the important and interesting questions involved in them.

DUER vs. SMALL.

In the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District
of New York-In Equity.
DENNING DUER vs. WILSON SMALL, RECEIVER OF TAXES, EIT AL.
The statute of the State of New York, which provides that all persons doing business
in the State of New York, as merchants, bankers or otherwise, and not residents of
the State, shall be assessed and taxed on all sums invested in their business, the
same as if they were residents of the State, is not in conflict with any provision
of the Constitution of the United States.

The facts of the case sufficiently appear in the opinion of
J.-The complainant is a resident and citizen of the
State of New Jersey, and has been such a resident and citizen since
the month of January, 1855. During all that time he was, and still
is, engaged in the business of banking in the City of New York, as
a partner in the firm of James G. King & Sons. The defendant
is the receiver of taxes in and for the City and County of New York.
The law of the State of New York provides that all persons doing
business in the State of New York, as merchants, bankers, or otherwvise, and not residents of the State, shall be assessed and taxed on
all sums invested in their business the same as if they were residents
of the State. Residents and non-residents, with respect to taxes
on personal property invested in business in the State, are put on
an equality.
The complainant was assessed and taxed upon his personal property invested in his said business in the City of New York, in the
years 1855, 1856 and 1857. The amount of these taxes is about
81,400. He refuses to pay the same. He alleges in his bill that
the law of the State of New York, the substance of which is above
set forth, is in violation of the Constitution of the United States,
and is otherwise illegal and void. He prays for an injunction
restraining the defendant and others who may claim authority to
act, from issuing any warrant or other instrument, or from taking
any steps for the collection of said taxes, or from levying upon any
goods or chattels to satisfy the same.
Taxes are a portion that each individual gives of his property, in
INGERSOLL,
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order to secure or have the perfect enjoyment of the remainder.
Governments are established for the protection of persons and
property within the limits of the State; taxes are levied to enable
the Government to afford or give such protection. They are the
price and consideration paid for the protection afforded.
When the property of an individual receives the protection of the
State by its laws, it is right that he should afford to the State, in
the way of taxes, a recompense or consideration for such protection;
for otherwise that protection could not be extended to him. Without taxes the State would be powerless to afford protection. And
when the property of an individual receives the protection of the
State, it is equally right that the property protected, no matter
whether it be real or personal, should in such way yield a recompense or consideration.
The owner of property within the limits of a State, no matter
whether the property be real or personal, and no matter where the
owner has his domicile, has a right to call upon the Government of
the State to protect such property by its laws, and its officers acting
under such laws. But such protection cannot be afforded unless
means, by the way of taxes, are furnished to afford the protection.
And taxes are no more to be levied upon Ihe property of the resident
to protect the property of the non-resident, than taxes are to be
levied upon the property of a non-resident to protect the property
of the resident.
The property of a non-resident within the limits of a State, whether
it be real or personal, is equally protected by the laws, with the
property of the resident. There would appear, therefore, to be no
good reason why it should not equally pay in taxes for such protection: ho good reason why the non-resident with the resident, should
not give a portion in order to secure the perfect enjoyment of the
remainder.
The laws of New York, like the laws of all the States in the Union,
declare that all real estate within the State, by whomsoever owned,
shall be taxed. The laws of the State, by virtue of which the taxes
in the bill complained of were imposed, declare that all personal
estate invested by a non-resident owner in business within the State
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(and who, by such investing, calls upon the State for protection to
such property), shall be assessed and taxed the same as if it were
so invested by residents; that all personal property invested in
business within the State shall pay alike for the security and protec
tion afforded it by the Government, and means are provided by the
laws to make it pay for such security and protection.
If a non-resident does not like to pay for such security and protection, he can withh'aw his personal property from the State, and
thus free himself from such payment. There is no law which compels him to put his property under the protection of the laws of a
State of which he is not a citizen or residant. But while he asks
and demands protection from the laws, there is no good reason why
he should not pay for it; no good reason why he should demand
that the property of the resident should pay for it; and there is no
higher law of the United States which gives a non-resident a right
to demand that the property of the resident citizen should pay for
the protection afforded by the laws to the property of the non-resident. The equal "immunities and privileges" secured to the "citizens of each State," in the "several States," does not demand such
a requirement as this. With respect to real estate, the non-resident
cannot withdraw it from the State, even if he does not like the law,
but is compelled to let it remain within the limits of the State where
it is taxed.

The superior law of the United States, which forbids the imposition
of duties by a State upon property imported from a foreign country,
does not forbid the State, after it has been imported and has become
mixed with other property in the State, and thereby requires the
protection of the laws of the State, from exercising the right to
require that such property, by whomsoever it may be owned, should
pay for the protection afforded it.
It is admitted by the complainant, that the real estate of a nonresident is liable to pay, in taxes, for the protection afforded it by
the State; and the chief reason urged why personal estate is not
subject to the same rule is, that the rule of law is,,that persoual
estate follows the person of the owner, and that, therefore, it may
be taxed in the State where the owner is domiciled. There is no
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allegation in the bill that the personal estate of the complainant,
invested by him in business within this State, has been taxed in
New Jersey, the State of his domicil. But if it were so taxed, it
would not follow that it could not be taxed in the State where it
actually was, and where protection was actually afforded it. If a
non-resident owner of real estate should be taxed in the State of
his domicil, on an assessment of what he was worth, which should
include the value of the real estate which he owns in another State;
or, if he should be assessed upon his income, which included the
rent of such real estate, that would be no good reason why the State
in which the real estate was, and which actually affords the protection of its laws to it, and by which protection he would be able to
receive rent, should not have the right to compel such real estate
to contribute to the expense and cost of such protection actually
afforded.
Bank stock is personal estate. According to the rule of law it
follows, with all other personal property, the person of the owner.
Such stock, whether owned by a resident or non-resident, is usually
taxed in the State where the bank is located. It is believed that
laws taxing such stock are not obnoxious to the charge of being
opposed to any constitutional law, either state or national. It
would seem to be enough that the property of a non-resident, whether
that property be real or personal, should be put upon an equality in
respect to taxation, with the property of a resident, without requiring that it should have greater privileges.
"The taxing power of a State is one of its attributes of sovereignty,
and where there has been no compact with the federal government,
or cession of jurisdiction for the purposes specified in the Constitution, this power reaches all the property and business within the
State." Nathan vs. Louisiana, 8 Howard, p. 82. In the case of
Catlin vs. Hull, 21 Vermont, 152, it was held "that the personal
property of a non-resident in a State where he was not domiciled,
might be taxed in such latter State."
The law of New York prescribes that the tax on the personal
estate of such non-resident may be collected from the property of
the firms, persons, or associations to which they severally belong.

